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This paper, which is a revised version of the ADB Working Paper on Regional Economic 
Integration No. 2, reviews trends in East Asian regionalism in the areas of trade and investment, 
money and finance, and infrastructure. It finds that trade and, to a lesser extent, financial 
integration is starting to increase in the region. It also finds that business cycles are starting to 
be more synchronized, enhancing the case for further monetary integration among these 




The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the 
views and policies of the Asian Development Bank or its Board of Governors or the 
governments they represent.   
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Economic Integration in East Asia: 




East Asia’s experience with open market-oriented development policies during the last four 
decades is well-known. This market-oriented approach involved unilateral reforms and 
embraced multilateralism under the GATT/WTO framework and led to East Asia’s economic 
dynamism and global integration, in tandem with regional integration in international trade and 
capital flows. Regional integration flourished under the multilateral framework of trade—driven 
by increasing market access and the force of competition. It was only in the late 1990s that East 
Asia began to pursue regionalism more actively.
1 This development can be attributed, as Kawai 
(2005) and others have mentioned, to various factors such as growing economic 
interdependence in the region, the slow progress in multilateralism and popularity of regionalism 
elsewhere, and various lessons learned from the 1997–98 financial crisis. 
 
This paper has three objectives: (i) to review the progress in market-led integration in East Asia 
(defined as ASEAN+3
2 unless specified otherwise); (ii) to argue that this market-led integration 
is now being complemented by various government efforts and institutions and will continue to 
drive economic integration, despite challenges such as the economic heterogeneity of countries 
and the oft-cited lack of political will within the region, and (iii) to outline a possible roadmap that 
the region may adopt to enhance regional integration. Needless to say, an East Asian economic 
community (on the trade front) and a single currency (on the monetary front) are long-term goals 
at best. However, transitional goals of integration in various areas are beneficial in their own 
right and will continue to drive East Asian integration forward. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the trends in East Asian regionalism 
in the areas of trade and investment, money and finance, and infrastructure and associated 
software development. Section III presents various indicators of trade (similar to Kawai, 2005 
and others) and financial integration. Section IV explores whether increased trade integration 
has led to a greater synchronization of East Asian business cycles. Section V outlines a 
roadmap East Asian countries could adopt to enhance the integration process. And finally, 
Section VI summarizes the paper and offers some conclusions. 
 
II.  Regionalism in East Asia 
 
East Asian regionalism, which began in the late 1990s, has two features. First, in terms of scope 
it covers three areas—trade and investment, money and finance, and infrastructure and 
associated software. Second, in terms of geographical coverage, except for money and finance, 
it has been mainly bilateral and subregional. More recently, bridges are being built across the 





                                                  
1 In contrast, regionalism was popular in Latin America and Africa in the 1960s, driven by the desire to consolidate 
import-substitution policies in a regional context.   These efforts were highly protectionist and ineffective (later 
referred to as “closed regionalism”). 
2 ASEAN+3 includes the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet 
Nam), People’s Republic of China, Japan, and Republic of Korea.  
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Trade and Investment 
 
As mentioned, East Asia basically adopted multilateralism in designing its trade policy. In this 
sense, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) initiated in 1992 was an exception. However, with 
the signing of the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement in November 2002 and 
the Framework Agreement on ASEAN—China FTA that same month and year, the region’s 
approach seems to have changed. Presently, the region is experiencing a proliferation of FTAs 
(see Appendix 1 for an annotated list). Within East Asia, eight FTAs have been signed and are 
presently under implementation, six are under negotiation and seven have been proposed. 
Similarly, between East Asia and South Asia, two FTAs are under implementation, eight under 
negotiation, and six have been proposed. Many of the FTAs in East Asia are FTA Plus in the 
sense that they go beyond just tariff reduction—into trade facilitation measures for customs 
duties, partial movement of labor, or the opening of government procurements, among others. 
The India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement covers not only trade in 
goods but also services, investments, and cooperation in technology, education, air services, 
and human resources. 
 
The growing number of FTAs in the region is in part a response to the uncertain progress of 
multilateral trade liberalization under the auspices of WTO. There is also a precautionary motive 
behind them as countries seek to avoid being placed at a competitive disadvantage by the other 
regional trading arrangements that are taking shape in the rest of the world. Another factor 
behind the spread of FTAs is that many economies that are geographically close to each other 
have already established strong trade and investment relationships and now wish to deepen 
their economic cooperation. For example, ASEAN has established closer economic 
partnerships with the “+3” countries (the PRC, Japan, and the Republic of Korea) and other 
trading partners (Australia, New Zealand, and India). The outcome of these agreements has 
been the establishment of various FTAs between ASEAN and these countries. 
 
There are positive and negative implications of the spread of FTAs in Asia. On the positive side, 
the proliferation of FTAs can help countries to pursue their dynamic comparative advantage and 
allocate resources efficiently. Against a backdrop of slow progress in global trade negotiations, 
FTAs can promote continuing liberalization, induce domestic and structural reforms in the 
countries concerned, and widen market access across the region. Trade arrangements with 
dynamic, competitive partners can also encourage the spread of efficient production practices.  
On the negative side, FTAs can be trade diverting and the demands of negotiating many trade 
agreements place increasing strains on scarce trade-negotiation resources of many countries, 
especially given the expanding scope, content, and increasing complexity of recently negotiated 
FTAs in the region. Overlapping FTAs also increase the cost of international trade. 
 
Also at the Bali Summit in 2003, the ASEAN leaders decided to establish an ASEAN 
Community comprising an ASEAN Economic Community, an ASEAN Security Community, and 
an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.   The deadline for the establishment of the ASEAN 
Economic Community has been advanced from 2020 to 2015. 
 
Money and Finance 
 
In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, East Asian countries have sought to promote closer 
monetary and financial cooperation. There is an ascending order of intensity of these efforts in 
the sense that they involve progressively increasing constraints on the amount of discretion that 
individual countries can exercise in the design of macroeconomic policies. By level of intensity,  
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these efforts have ranged from economic review and policy dialogue to establishing regional 
financing arrangements and eventually toward coordinating exchange rate policies.  
 
In the area of economic review and policy dialogue, there are two major ongoing initiatives. First, 
the ASEAN Surveillance Process was established in October 1998 to strengthen the policy-
making capacity within the group. Based on the principles of peer review and mutual interest, 
this process reviews global, regional, and individual country developments and monitors 
exchange rate and macroeconomic aggregates, as well as sectoral and social policies. Under 
this Process, the ASEAN Finance Ministers meet annually and the ministries of finance and 
central bank deputies meet semiannually to discuss issues of common interest. Second, with 
the formation of the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Process in November 1999, the first ASEAN+3 
Economic Review and Policy Dialogue (ERPD) was held in May 2000. Under the ERPD, 
ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers meet annually and their deputies meet semiannually. Steps have 
been taken to monitor short-term capital flows and to develop early warning systems of currency 
and banking crises. Initially, Deputies would meet for a couple of hours but now they meet for a 
full day and a half. The value-added of regional monitoring is that countries tend to be more 
frank with each other in a regional forum as they tend to focus on issues of common interest. An 
ASEAN+3 Research Group, comprising about 30 think tanks from across the region, has also 
been established to support ERPD. Until its dissolution in December 2005, the Manila 
Framework Group was another forum that brought together deputies from a wide-range of 
countries for policy dialogue. 
 
Progress has also been made in establishing regional financing arrangements. At their May 
2000 meeting in Chiang Mai, Thailand, the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers agreed on the Chiang 
Mai Initiative (CMI) to expand the ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA) to all ASEAN members, 
and to set up a network of bilateral swap arrangements (BSAs) among ASEAN+3 countries. 
The ASA expansion was done in November 2000, and its size increased from $200 million to 
$1  billion. In April 2005, the size of the ASA was again increased to $2 billion. At their May 
2005 meeting, the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers announced that the size of existing bilateral 
swaps would be doubled and that swaps would be signed among ASEAN countries as well.
3 To 
date, ASEAN+3 countries have signed 16 bilateral swaps amounting to $75 billion, almost 
double from a year ago. At the May 2005 meeting, the ministers decided to increase the 
percentage of swaps that can be disbursed without IMF-supported programs from 10% to 20%. 
They also agreed on a collective decision-making system for BSAs. Although the latter 
agreement to some extent complicates, the administration of the bilateral swaps, it is an 
important breakthrough for two reasons: (i) as mentioned in the Ministerial Statement, it is the 
first step to the full multilateralization of bilateral swaps, and (ii) it is also the first time that the 
ASEAN+3 members agreed to sacrifice a certain amount of national sovereignty for the 
common regional good. There was further progress at the May  2006 meeting, where the 
ministers decided that “all swap providing countries can simultaneously and promptly provide 
liquidity support to any parties involved in bilateral swap arrangements at times of emergency” 
and “set up a new task force to further study various possible options towards an advanced 
framework of the regional liquidity support arrangement (CMI multilateralization or Post-CMI).”
4  
 
In the area of exchange rate coordination, aside from the conduct of research under various fora 
such as the ASEAN Currency and Exchange Rate Mechanism Task Force, the Kobe Research 
Project of the Asia-Europe Finance Ministers, and the ASEAN+3 Research Group, there has yet 
                                                  
3 Joint Ministerial Statement of the 8
th ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ Meeting, 4 May 2005, Istanbul, Turkey. 
4 Joint Ministerial Statement of the 9




to be a clear regional initiative. This will, however, undoubtedly change as the integration 
process moves forward, business cycles become more synchronized, and macroeconomic 
policy interdependence becomes stronger.
5  In fact, at the May 2006 meeting, the ASEAN+3 
finance ministers endorsed a study on “regional monetary units.” On 21 July 2005, the PRC and 
Malaysia joined Singapore in adopting a managed floating exchange rate regime based on a 
currency basket, which suggests the basket-pegging regime is gaining popularity in the region 
and in due course could culminate in enhanced exchange rate coordination. 
 
For other types of financial sector cooperation, East Asia has come up with a number of 
initiatives to develop regional bond markets. These include the APEC Bond Initiative, the Asian 
Bond Fund (ABF) Initiative under the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia Pacific Central Banks 
(EMEAP), and the Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI) under the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers 
Process. In 2003, EMEAP launched ABF1, which had an initial size of $1 billion, and invested in 
US dollar-denominated bonds issued by Asian sovereign and quasi-sovereign issuers. A 
$2  billion ABF2, which invests in bonds denominated in regional currencies, began 
implementation in April 2005. Under the ABMI, ASEAN+3 established several apex bodies —a 
Focal Group with an Ad Hoc Support Group and Technical Assistance (TA) Coordination 
Group—and four working groups that meet regularly. The AsianBondsOnline website was 
launched in May 2005
6—developed by ADB, it has become a popular one-stop clearinghouse of 
information on sovereign and corporate bonds issued in ASEAN+3 countries. 
 
Infrastructure and Associated Software 
 
In Asia, most of the poor live in remote or isolated areas, especially in regions close to national 
borders. They need to be linked to commercial and industrial centers not only within their own 
countries but to those in other countries in the region and beyond as well—via highways, 
railways, ports, telecommunications, and other “hard” infrastructure. The “software” aspects of 
infrastructure development, including trade facilitation, are also important for the smooth flow of 
traffic. Greater connectivity enhances trade and investment integration by facilitating movement 
of goods.  
 
The most advanced program in Asia is the Greater Mekong Subregion—comprising Cambodia, 
Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, Viet Nam, and Yunnan Province of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC). The six countries initiated the program of subregional cooperation in 1992. The 
Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines-East Asian Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) 
initiative was also begun in 1992.  
 
In South Asia, at the request of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal, ADB launched the South 
Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) Program in 2001. The SASEC Program 
promotes economic cooperation in six priority sectors: transport; trade, investment, and private 
sector cooperation; tourism; energy and power; environment; and information communication 
technology. Similarly, in Central Asia there is the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation 
(CAREC) program. Begun in 1997, this program has focused on regional initiatives in transport, 
energy, trade facilitation, and trade policy.  There are also efforts to link western South Asia with 
Central Asia under the Subregional Economic Cooperation in South and Central Asia 
(SECSCA) program started in 2003. The SECSCA Program provides transport and trade 
facilitation along the road corridors connecting the Central Asian republics to the Arabian Sea 
                                                  
5 Some evidence on these trends is provided in Section IV. 
6  This website tracks developments in East Asia’s local currency bond markets and provides detailed progress 
reports on the various ABMI initiatives, among others.  
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and the Pacific Gulf via Afghanistan. There are now efforts to link East Asia with South Asia 
through the East-West corridor project involving India, Thailand, and Myanmar.  
 




Tables 1 and 2 basically update the various measures of trade integration developed, among 
others, by Kawai (2005) using data from the June 2006 International Monetary Fund Direction of 
Trade Statistics CD-Rom. Table 1 shows that during the period 1980 to 2005,  intraregional 
trade among ASEAN+3 members increased steadily from 30.2% to 38.2%.
7  This level is 
somewhat lower than NAFTA (45.0%) but significantly lower than that for EU-25 (66.2%). If, 
however, we include data from Hong Kong, China and Taipei,China, the intraregional trade ratio 
increases to 54.5%, well above NAFTA and closer to the EU-25 level. Intraregional trade among 
ASEAN countries has remained unchanged since 1995 while among the South Asian countries, 
it has increased somewhat.  
 
Table 1: Intraregional Trade (as % of total world trade)
 1 
       
     1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005 
       
Brunei Darussalam         80.1 77.3 81.7 79.5 74.2 75.0 
Cambodia                     67.4  68.6  81.5  35.8  46.8 
Indonesia                58.3  53.3  51.7 49.5 50.6 54.6 
Lao People’s Dem. Rep        82.6 85.7 65.3 72.8 74.0 
Malaysia                    46.7  54.1  49.6  48.2  49.4  54.7 
Myanmar                    50.6  42.9  58.7  72.5  62.2  74.9 
Philippines     33.8  36.0 32.8 37.5 39.7 52.7 
Singapore               36.8  40.6  39.5 47.2 46.5 45.4 
Thailand                    38.1  42.7  42.6  43.7  44.9  49.5 
Viet  Nam     10.5 27.8 57.6 56.4 52.7 
China, People’s Rep. of    29.4  36.2  21.3 33.7 33.1 30.0 
Korea, Rep. of        29.2 26.7 29.1 35.4 36.6 43.6 
Japan                       20.7  20.3  21.2  29.9  30.9  36.8     
ASEAN+  3        30.2 30.2 29.3 37.3 37.0 38.2    
         
M e m o   I t e m s :           
ASEAN          17.9 20.3 18.8 23.9 24.5 24.0    
ASEAN+3 +  
Hong Kong, China + Taipei,China    34.6 37.1 43.0 51.7 51.9 54.5    
SOUTH ASIA          4.6    3.2    2.9    4.0    4.2    5.5   
   
European Union (EU-25)      61.3 59.8 67.0 67.4 66.8 66.2    
NAFTA      33.8  38.7  37.9 43.1 48.8 45.0    
 
1For regional groupings, intraregional trade share is calculated using export data and the formula: Xii /{(Xiw 
+ Xwi)/2}, where Xii is export of region i to region i; Xiw is export of region i to the world, and Xwi is export of 
w o r l d   t o   r e g i o n   i .           
    
   
Sources: International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics CD-Rom (June 2006), and CEIC. 
         
Table 2 presents data on total trade intensity indexes which, by adjusting for the country or 
region’s relative size, gives a better measure of economic interdependence. The data show that 
after a dip in the 1980s, total trade intensity index among the ASEAN+3 countries has remained 
                                                  
7  Country-level data suggest that intra-ASEAN trade ratios were the highest for Brunei Darussalam and the newer 
ASEAN member countries and the lowest for PRC, Japan, and Korea, with other countries falling in between.  
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relatively steady at about 2 since 1990. This level is higher than that for EU-25 (1.7) and lower 
than that for NAFTA (2.6). 
 
Table 2: Intraregional Trade Intensity Index
1 
         
            1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
         
Brunei Darussalam         6.7 5.4 5.3 4.0 3.7 3.5 
Cambodia                     4.7  4.4  4.1  1.8  2.2 
Indonesia                   4.9  3.7  3.4  2.5  2.5  2.5 
Lao People’s Dem. Rep        5.8 5.6 3.3 3.7 3.4 
Malaysia                    3.9  3.8  3.2  2.4  2.5  2.5 
Myanmar                    4.2  3.0  3.8  3.6  3.1  3.5 
Philippines     2.8  2.5 2.1 1.9 2.0 2.4 
Singapore                  3.1  2.8  2.6  2.4  2.3  2.1 
Thailand                    3.2  3.0  2.8  2.2  2.3  2.3 
Viet  Nam     0.7  1.8  2.9  2.8  2.4 
China, People’s Rep. of      2.5 2.5 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.4 
Korea, Rep. of        2.4 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 2.0 
Japan                       1.7  1.4  1.4  1.5  1.5  1.7     
ASEAN+  3        2.4 2.1 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.9    
           
M e m o   I t e m s :           
ASEAN          4.8 5.7 4.4 3.7 4.0 4.2    
ASEAN+3 +  
Hong  Kong,  China  +  Taipei,China    2.5 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.2    
SOUTH  ASIA     5.1  2.9 3.0 3.9 3.9 4.1 
European Union (EU-25)      1.5 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.7    
N A F T A       2 . 1   2 . 0   2.1 2.4 2.2 2.6    
                 
1 Intraregional trade intensity index is the ratio of intraregional trade share to the share of world’s trade with the region. 
For regional groupings, trade intensity index is calculated using export data and the formula: [ Xii /{(Xiw + Xwi)/2} ] / 
[ {(Xiw + Xwi)/2}/Xww ], where Xii is export of region i to region i; Xiw is export of region i to the world, Xwi is export of 
world to region i, and Xww is total world export.          
 
Sources: International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics CD-Rom (June 2006), and CEIC.   
         
Financial Integration 
 
Partly because of data problems – data on bilateral capital flows are not generally available – 
analysis of financial integration in East Asia has led to conflicting results. A much quoted 
example is the debate between Park and Bae (2002) and McCauley, Fung, and Gadanecz 
(2002). The former assert that in the process of financial opening, East Asian countries have 
developed stronger ties with advanced countries rather than with one another, implying a lack of 
financial integration among East Asian countries. The latter, by investigating data on bond 
financing and loans syndicated for East Asian borrowers, has argued that East Asian financial 
markets are more integrated than commonly thought.  
 
For international bonds issued by East Asian borrowers between April 1999 and August 2002, 
McCauley et al found that the shares of book runners headquartered in North America and 
Europe were 54% and 29%, respectively, while the share from Asia was 17%.
8 During  the 
period from September 2002 to May 2005, the share of Europe increased to 37% and that of 
North America decreased to 44%. Asia’s share increased slightly to 19%. 
 
                                                  
8 HSBC and Standard Chartered are treated as Hong Kong, China banks.  
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As McCauley et al cautioned, however, that one should not draw any inference about regional 
financial integration from the above data. We need information on the nationality of bondholders. 
McCauley et  al collected information on new international bonds issued from various trade 
periodicals to measure Asia’s share of the initial allocations of bonds issued by Asian borrowers 
from April 1999 to August 2002. He found that, for a sample of 71 bonds issued, the weighted 
average Asian share of primary market distribution was 44%.
9 We have updated the analysis for 
the period from September 2002 to May 2005 and find that, for a sample of 58 international 
bonds issued by various East Asian countries, the Asian share continues to remain high at 
44.2% in weighted average terms (Table 3). 
 
Table 3: International Bond Issuance by Asian Issuers 
(Aug 2002 - May 2005) 
        
Issuing Country  Number of 
Issues 
Total Value of 





              
China, People's Rep. of  5 
  
3,056  43.1 56.9
Hong Kong, China  11 
  
8,425 32.7  67.3
Indonesia 7 
  
3,100  58.8 41.2
Korea, Rep. of  25 
  
11,498  44.8 55.2
Philippines 6 
  
3,230 48.1  51.9
Singapore 3 
  
2,617 55.4  44.6
Thailand 1 
  
350  65.0 35.0
             
TOTAL  58 
  
32,276 




AVERAGE (%)        44.6  55.4
WEIGHTED AVERAGE (%)        44.2  55.8
Source: Finance Asia.         
 
For syndicated loan markets, using arranger league tables from Dealogic Loanware between 
1999 and 2002, McCauley found that 63% of syndicated credit facilities signed by borrowers in 
East Asia were arranged by East Asian
10 and Japanese banks. US banks arranged another 
12% and European banks 23%. Our update for the January 2003–May 2005 period finds that 
the East Asian and Japanese bank share increased to 68%, while the US and European bank 
shares declined slightly. 
 
In terms of participation in syndicates, during the period 1999–2002, East Asian banks initially 
provided 50–85% of funds to borrowers in East Asia for internationally syndicated loans 
(Figure 1). This ratio increased to 60–95% during the January 2003 to May 2005 period, except 
                                                  
9  The discussion in this and the following paragraphs provide an indication of only primary market allocation.   
However, McCauley mentions that discussions with market participants suggest that subsequent trading in 
secondary markets is likely to move more papers/loans into regional portfolios. 
10 PRC; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Korea; Singapore; Thailand; and Taipei,China.  
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in Indonesia, where it declined somewhat during the two periods. Banks of the same nationality 
as the borrower on average provide about 30% of funding. These may reflect a “home bias” of 
banks and have little to do with financial integration. However, even if this portion is netted out, 
the share of other East Asian banks including Japan shows an increasing trend in most 
countries.
11 Therefore, East Asia is less exposed than some imagine to sudden and large-scale 
cessation of capital flows from Europe on the one hand, and the US on the other. 


































































PRC HKG INO  KOR SIN THA TAP
1 PRC; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Korea; Singapore; Thailand; and Taipei,China
Notes: 1 - Average from 1999 to 2002      2 - Average from 2003 to May 2005
Source: Deologic Loanware
 
Available price and quantity measures of financial integration in East Asia are presented in 
Figures 2.1-2.3.  These indicate that in recent years, financial integration in East Asia has 







                                                  
11  Many underwriters do not provide bond issue data on Pan-Asian investment versus investment from issuer’s 







Financial Integration: Price and Quantity Indicators 








2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
ASEAN 5
ASEAN 5 +3
ASEAN 5 +3 +HK + Taipei,China
Source: Bloomberg LP.
*ASEAN 5 consists of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
 







2002 2003 2004 2005
ASEAN 5
ASEAN 5 +3
ASEAN 5 +3 +HK + Taipei,China
Source: Bloomberg LP.














2001 2002 2003 2004
ASEAN 5
ASEAN 5 +3
ASEAN 5 +3 +HK + Taipei,China
Source: International Monetary Fund, Coordinated Portfolio Investment  Survey.
*ASEAN 5 consists of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
 
IV.  Synchronization of East Asian Business Cycles 
 
Has increased trade integration in East Asia led to greater synchronization of business cycles? 
Theoretically, the answer is unclear. If trade is based on Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardian 
principles of comparative advantage, higher specialization would induce the industrial structures 
of trading countries to diverge, resulting in less synchronized movements of business cycles. In 
contrast, if trade occurs mainly through intra-industry trade, business cycle synchronization 
would be enhanced. In East Asia, with the establishment of regional production networks and 
supply chains by multinational corporations—and thus a high share of intra-industry trade—one 
would expect a positive correlation between trade integration and business cycle 
synchronization. However, empirical evidence is, mixed. Shin and Wang (2003) found an 
increase, while Crosby (2003) did not find any evidence of synchronization. It also appears that 
growing integration among G7 nations





Using annual GDP growth rates for 11 of the ASEAN+3 countries for which data are available 
(exceptions are Brunei Darussalam and Cambodia), simple 10-year moving correlations 
between GDP growth of individual ASEAN+3 members and the group (excluding the individual 
member) were calculated from 1989 to 2003. Figure 3.1 shows that correlations have been 
increasing, especially after the financial crisis, suggesting greater synchronization of business 
cycles among ASEAN+3 countries. Correlations have been converging toward 1 in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand and toward 0.6 – 0.7 in Korea, Japan, Lao PDR, Singapore, 
                                                  
12 G7 consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States.  
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and Viet Nam. They are lower, however, in the PRC and Myanmar. On the other hand, with a 
few exceptions (Singapore, Japan, Malaysia, and Korea), 10-year moving correlations between 
growth rates of individual ASEAN+ 3 countries with the US have shown a downward trend in the 
postcrisis period (Figure 3.2). This trend is also visible in the region’s growth correlation with G7 
members France, Germany and Italy (Figure 3.3).  
 
Figure 3: 10-Year Moving Correlation of GDP Growth 
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INO LAO MAL MYA PHI SIN
THA VIE PRC JAP KOR
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1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
US EU in G-7
 
 
1 EU = France, Germany, and Italy 
 
Following Frankel and Rose (1998), the above correlations were recalculated using only the 
cyclical component of GDP growth (Figure 4). The Hodrick-Prescott filter was used to de-trend 
the variables and 10-year moving correlations were calculated. The results are broadly similar, 
although, as expected, the correlation ratios are relatively lower. 
 
Figure 4: 10-Year Moving Correlation of Cyclical Component of GDP Growth 
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To address some of the weakness associated with simple correlations, the VAR method was 
used (VAR takes into account dynamic information about the co-movements of variables, 
including lags and leads). Unfortunately, VAR analysis requires a large number of data points, 
thus available monthly industrial production data were used. Even then, only eight ASEAN+3 
members—PRC, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—
and the US (as an outside country) could be included in the sample. The period from January 
1989 to December 2004 was used and all variables were expressed as the first difference of 
logs. 
 
Assume that the time-series process for an industrial production index can be approximated by 
a vector auto-regression, and consider Xt which is an 9-vector industrial production variable. 
The VAR model is as follows:  
 
          L  
    X i,t =  αi + ∑ Ai,k Xi,t-k + vi,t ,   i = 1,...,9 
        k=1 
 
where Ai,k is a 9 x L matrix of regression coefficients, αi  is a 9-vector constant term, vi,t  is 9-
vector innovations terms, and L  is the total number of lags. To avoid the trade-off problem 
between R
2 value and the number of explanatory variables, we use the Akaike Criterion Test. 
As a result, L = 5, or five lags were found to be optimal for this model. 
 
Table 4 presents the correlation coefficients between the fitted values of growth rates in the 
precrisis (January 1989–June 1997) and postcrisis periods (July 1997–December 2004). The 
data confirm that correlation of industrial production between all possible pairs of East Asian 
countries has increased in the postcrisis period as compared with the precrisis period. They are 
high and statistically significant in country combinations involving Indonesia, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The PRC appears to be the only outlier—its 






















                                                  




Table 4: Correlation Coefficients of Fitted Industrial Production Index Using VAR 
 
Pre-Crisis Period 
   PRC INO  KOR  MAL  PHI  SIN  THA  JPN  USA 
PRC 1.000  0.141  0.427  -0.110  -0.405 0.374  -0.156 0.162  0.077 
INO     1.000  -0.384 0.070 -0.313 0.300  -0.186  0.299  -0.454 
KOR        1.000  0.213  -0.003 0.457  0.318  0.206 -0.119 
MAL           1.000  0.067 0.431  -0.205  0.188  -0.159 
PHI              1.000  0.151  0.469  -0.108  0.454 
SIN                 1.000  0.381  0.443  -0.169 
THA                    1.000  0.240  -0.200 
JPN                       1.000  -0.513 
USA                           1.000 
Post-Crisis Period 
   PRC INO  KOR  MAL  PHI  SIN  THA  JPN  USA 
PRC 1.000  0.243  0.594  0.350  0.320 0.603  0.392 0.236  0.146 
INO      1.000  0.741* 0.807* 0.742* 0.669*  0.714*  0.800*  -0.164 
KOR        1.000  0.617  0.745*  0.676* 0.747*  0.664*  -0.134 
MAL           1.000  0.684*  0.743* 0.723*  0.716*  -0.060 
PHI              1.000  0.695*  0.672*  0.711*  -0.244 
SIN                 1.000  0.604  0.663  0.060 
THA                    1.000  0.551  0.204 
JPN                       1.000  -0.273 
USA                           1.000 
               
Note: (*) statistically significant at the 5% level. 
PRC = People’s Republic of China, INO = Indonesia, KOR = Korea, MAL = Malaysia, PHI = Philippines, SIN = 
Singapore, THA = Thailand, JPN = Japan, and USA = United States 
 
On one hand, simple bilateral correlations had suggested that co-movements between East 
Asian and US GDP growth had declined in the postcrisis period. The VAR analysis, on the other 
hand, suggests that they increased, except in Korea and the Philippines. The correlations are, 
however, low and statistically insignificant. 
 
In general, the more synchronized the economic activity within the region, the higher the degree 
of resilience of regional activity to outside shocks. To test the validity of this argument, the 
impulse response functions derived from the VAR analysis were examined. These functions 
provide complete information about the co-movement of industrial production after a shock. Two 




14 The magnitude of each shock was one standard deviation of the forecast 
error and, after the initial one-time shock, the response period given was 36 months.  
 
Table 5 presents the simple mean of the impulse response considering the absolute levels. The 
table shows that responses in East Asian countries to both external and regional shocks in 
industrial production have become more pronounced in the postcrisis period. This suggests that 
despite the synchronization of business cycles, East Asian countries have not become more 
resilient to external shocks—at least not yet.  
 
Table 5: Mean of Absolute Value of Impulse Response Using VAR 
 
From Shock in U.S. 
   USA JPN PRC SIN  KOR  MAL  THA  INO  PHI 
Before Crisis  0.083  0.106  0.046 0.065  0.037  0.03  0.04 0.018  0.032 
After Crisis  0.131  0.19  0.2  0.059 0.118 0.137 0.093 0.07 0.067 
From Shock in Korea 
   USA JPN PRC SIN  KOR  MAL  THA  INO  PHI 
Before Crisis  0.055  0.104  0.088 0.072  0.11  0.029  0.051 0.035 0.047 
After Crisis  0.066  0.186  0.166  0.103 0.121 0.077 0.089 0.045 0.073 
From Shock in Thailand 
   USA JPN PRC SIN  KOR  MAL  THA  INO  PHI 
Before Crisis  0.087  0.113  0.05 0.06  0.027 0.028  0.03 0.017  0.027 
After Crisis  0.103  0.135  0.086  0.048 0.049 0.044 0.043 0.031 0.043 
  
PRC = People’s Republic of China, INO = Indonesia, KOR = Korea, MAL = Malaysia, PHI = Philippines, SIN = 
Singapore, THA = Thailand, JPN = Japan, and USA = United States 
 
Multiple Regression Analysis 
 
In order to analyze more formally the relationship between trade intensity and synchronization of 
economic activity, following Shin and Wang (2003) and Frankel and Rose (1998), we specify the 
following model:
15  
   c o r r   IP (i,j)t  = α  +  α1  TI (i, j)t  + α2  corr RI (i, j)t  +  εijt   
 
where corr IP ( i,j)t refers to the correlation of de-trended industrial production index 
between  country i  and  j  at time  t ,  
 
  TI (i, j)t  refers to bilateral trade intensity index between country  i  and  j  at time  t  
defined as 
                                                  
14 These two countries were selected because they were statistically significant for “Granger-caused” shocks affecting 
regional economies.  
15 Frankel and Rose included only the trade intensity term.  This approach leads to an endogeneity problem because 
of omitted variables (namely, macroeconomic coordination).  Shin and Wang do not present the results for the 




        Tijt___      
   Tit + Tjt     where Tijt  is total trade between country  i  and  j  at time  t  and  Tit  and  Tjt  
are total trade of country  i  and  j  at time  t  respectively, and 
 
 corr  RI (i, j)t   is the monetary policy coordination variable defined as bilateral correlation 
of short-term real interest rate between  country  i  and  j  at time  t . 
 
The above model was estimated by pooling data from eight countries—PRC, Indonesia, Japan, 
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Monthly data were collected from 
January 1989 to December 2004. Five-year windows were used to calculate the bilateral 
correlations; hence our sample for the regressions was from January 1993 to December 2004. 
The sample was also broken into precrisis (January 1993–June 1997) and postcrisis (July 
1997–December 2004) periods, and the model estimated both with and without country dummy 
variables. The results are presented in Table 6. 
 
The estimated results show that bilateral trade intensity is statistically significant in explaining 
co-movements of industrial production index during the entire 1993–2004 sample period. 
However, the regression results for the precrisis and postcrisis periods show that this is true 
only during the postcrisis period. During the precrisis period, bilateral trade intensity did not 
seem to have any significant effect on business cycle synchronization. 
 
Addition of the monetary policy coordination variable to the regression does not reduce the 
magnitude or statistical significance of the trade intensity variable. Thus we can rule out the 
multicollinearity problem in the results. Both bilateral trade intensity and monetary policy 
coordination are statistically significant in explaining business cycle synchronization in the East 
Asian region. Once again, this is true mainly during the postcrisis period, when the pace of 
monetary and financial cooperation picked up and regular policy dialogue accelerated within the 
region. During this period, the bilateral correlation of real interest rates between countries 
increased in most cases. This correlation peaked in 2002 when many East Asian countries 
followed the most recent round of interest rate easing by the US Federal Reserve, which was in 




Table 6:  Business Cycle Co-movement Regressions 
 





Pooled Regression without Policy Coordination Factor 
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* Significant at 5%. 
** Significant at 10%. 
 
These findings have important implications for monetary cooperation in East Asia. Bayoumi and 
Mauro (1999) have calculated an OCA index for East Asia based on historical data of debt 
patterns and nature of disturbances and concluded that “On economic criteria, ASEAN appears 
less suited for a regional currency arrangement than Europe before the Maastricht Treaty was 
signed, although the difference was not large.” The findings of this paper that trade integration is 
leading to synchronization of business cycles, together with the findings of Frankel and Rose 
(1998) that the level of trade integration increases significantly after the formation of a currency 
union, suggest that although ex ante East Asia is not a good candidate for a currency union, ex  
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post (based on endogenous factors) it could be. The latter factors are important because trade 
expansion due to the formation of a currency union will lead to greater synchronization of 
business cycles, which in turn reduces the costs of a union by increasing the incidence of 
symmetric shocks.  
 
V.  A Roadmap for East Asia’s Integration 
 
According to Bela Balassa (1961), the degree of economic integration increases in a linear 
manner: FTA, customs union, common market, and economic and monetary union. In practice, 
however, no region in the world has adopted this textbook model. For example, even in Europe 
in the 1960s, there were two tracks: European Economic Community (EEC) and European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA). The EFTA continues to be an FTA, while EEC has moved from a 
customs union to a common market and is now an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
 
A similar multi-track system may be desirable for East Asia—a trade track and a monetary and 
finance track. On the trade track, given the proliferation of FTAs in the region, policy-makers 
should consider the so-called “spaghetti bowl” effects. FTAs require implementation of strict 
rules of origin and other conditions that increase administrative costs. If different agreements 
have different rules of origin, administrative costs could be high. To avoid this, FTAs should be 
carefully designed to ensure compatibility with others. A review system may be needed. FTA 
membership could also be expanded to eventually establish an ASEAN+3 FTA. To enhance 
trade integration, it will also be necessary to address connectivity issues, including infrastructure 
development and trade facilitation.  
 
On the money and finance track, three sub-tracks based on the typology developed in Section II 
could be considered. The short-term, medium-term, and long-term actions for each sub-track—
as highlighted in various ADB studies—are outlined in Table 7. With the recent decision to 
collectivize the decision-making process of CMI, the next steps are to fully multilateralize the 
swap arrangements by earmarking a portion of foreign exchange reserves held by ASEAN+3 
countries for financing members’ short-term liquidity needs. As part of this process, and also 
with a view to reducing the linkage to IMF conditionality, an independent policy dialogue unit 
should also be established for regional economic monitoring. Over the medium-term, a 
centralized reserve pool could be established—tentatively, an Asian Monetary Cooperation 
Fund (AMCF). After that, for the resource-sharing and exchange rate sub-tracks, two 
approaches are possible—the “European” approach and the “parallel currency” approach. 
Under the “European” approach, over the longer term, a common basket peg similar to the 
European Monetary System could be established. Then rigid Maastricht-type convergence 







Table 7:  Roadmap for Monetary and Financial Integration in East Asia: 
The “European” vs “Parallel Currency” Approaches 
 
















Establish an independent regional 
policy dialogue unit to prepare reports 
for peer review meetings—an early 
warning system should be an integral 
part. Monitor regional financial 
developments (including adoption and 
implementation of best practices). 
Develop terms of reference and 
conditionality to be associated with 
lending from a centralized reserve pool 




Expand the Bilateral Swap 
Agreement Network under the 
Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). 
 
Multilateralize the CMI by earmarking 
a portion of foreign exchange 
reserves for financing short-term 
liquidity needs of members. 
 















Develop alternative conditionality for 
balance of payments support. 
 
Establish a centralized reserve 
pool— the Asian Monetary 
Cooperation Fund (AMCF)—that 
seeks to prevent or manage financial 
crises in the region. 
 
The AMCF to issue a parallel 
currency to be called the Asia 
Currency Unit (ACU, a weighted 
basket of members’ currencies). 
 
Encourage ACU-denominated bonds 
and establish a regional clearing and 
payments mechanism for ACU 
transactions. 
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  As ACU transactions grow, transfer 
the ACU into sole legal tender for the 
region. Convert AMCF into an Asian 
Central Bank. 
 
 Establish  a 
common basket 







criteria. Adopt a 
single currency 

















Key:        The  “European”  Approach 
        The “Parallel Currency” Approach 
 
Sources:  ADB (2004) and Eichengreen (2006 forthcoming)  
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If the level of political will in the East Asian region is not strong enough to adopt a European 
approach, a parallel currency approach could be considered. This involves issuance of an Asian 
Currency Unit (a weighted basket of members’ currencies by the AMCF) in the medium-term of 
say three to five years. Then the issuance of ACU-denominated bonds could be encouraged 
and a clearing and settlement system for ACU transactions established. In the longer term, as 
the volume of ACU transactions increases, the ACU could develop into the sole legal tender 
within the region. The AMCF could be converted into an Asian Central Bank. 
 
As Eichengreen (2006 forthcoming) argues, the appeal of the parallel currency approach is 
dictated by economic forces (i.e., market forces) more than politics. This is consistent with the 
greater emphasis placed by East Asian countries on market-led rather than policy-led 
integration. It also accommodates the fact that the East Asian political context is very different 
compared with Europe. An underlying commitment to political solidarity drove the transition to 
monetary union in Europe. Eichengreen also mentions that Europe considered the parallel 
currency approach, but it was abandoned in favor of the Maastricht process because of the 
strong political commitment that existed at the time.  
 
Aside from being multi-track, East Asian integration could be multi-speed as well. On each track 
and sub-track, In East Asia, as we found in Section II, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand may be ready to move to a higher level of monetary and 
financial cooperation, but the PRC and others are not quite ready yet. Membership should also 




This paper has reviewed the trends and highlighted the prospects for enhancing economic 
integration in East Asia. The major findings are 
 
(i)  after the 1997–1998 financial crisis, the market-driven integration process in East Asia is 
becoming increasingly supported by public sector initiatives and institutional 
arrangements to enhance regionalism in trade and investment, money and finance, and 
infrastructure and associated software. 
 
(ii)  various quantitative measures suggest that trade and, to a lesser extent, financial 
integration are increasing within the East Asian region. 
 
(iii)  increased trade integration within the region (and monetary policy coordination) has led 
to greater synchronization of business cycles in a select group of countries, mainly due 
to the growing importance of intra-industry trade. This has important implications for the 
formation of a currency union in East Asia. 
 
Going forward, a “multi-track, multi-speed” or “variable geometry, flexible boundary” roadmap for 
East Asia based on various studies conducted at ADB is outlined. There could be a trade track 
and a money and finance track. The trade track could widen the web of proliferating FTAs into a 
seamless FTA for the entire ASEAN+3 region (eventually India could be included). On the 
money and finance track, the next agenda items are to fully multilaterize the CMI over the next 
three to five years together with strengthening regional surveillance, and establishing a 
centralized reserve pool (Asian Monetary Cooperation Fund). Thereafter, two approaches are 
possible—the “European” and the “parallel currency”—depending on the political context 
prevailing at the time. The latter approach is “bottom-up” and more market-oriented, an 
alternative to the rigid and relatively inflexible “top-down” European approach, which requires a  
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strong political commitment. In some sense, the “parallel currency” approach continues East 




Appendix 1: An Annotated List of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 




A. WITHIN  EAST  ASIA 
FTA SIGNED AND UNDER IMPLEMENTATION  
●  ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
○  Agreement on Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme (signed January 1992 and 
effective January 1993) required cut in tariff rates on products traded to 0-5% by 2003  
○  More than 99% of the products in the Inclusion List (IL) of ASEAN-6 now have tariffs in the 0-5% 
range while, for new ASEAN members, about 66% of the products have tariff rates between 0-5%  
○  An ASEAN Economic Community, characterized by freer flow of goods, services, investment, labor 
and capital, is targeted by 2020 
 
●  Japan-Singapore Economic Agreement for a New Age Partnership (JSEPA) 
○  JSEPA (signed February 2002 and effective November 2002) removes tariffs on 3,938 products 
imported from Singapore (raising tariff-free imports to 94%) and scraps all duties on Japanese 
exports to Singapore  
○  Removal of tariffs on 6,929 imported items from Singapore takes effect immediately while the rest 
will be scrapped by 2010 
○  The accord includes a new investment framework, custom automation, mutual recognition of 
standards, common rules on electronic commerce, and facilitation of exchange of experienced 
workers 
 
●  ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA)  
○  Framework Agreement signed November 2002 and became effective July 2003 
○  Agreement on Trade in Goods was signed in November 2004 and became effective January 2005 
○  Reduction in tariff rates for manufactured goods started on 20 July 2005 
○  Tariffs on 7,445 kinds of goods will be cut to 5% or less by 2010 for ASEAN-6 and 2015 for newer 
ASEAN members 
○  Fruits and vegetables in bilateral trade have been tariff-free since October 2003 while the Early 
Harvest Plan has allowed tariff reduction in 570 kinds of products since January 2004 
 
●  Korea-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (KSFTA) 
○  Negotiations for KSFTA that began in November 2002 were concluded November 2004. The FTA 
became effective March 2006 
○  Under KSFTA (expected to be effective in the second half of 2005), Singapore will remove tariffs on 
all items and Korea will scrap duties on 91.6% of all products over the next 10 years  
○  Singapore will also have enhanced access to Korean education, logistics, and environmental 
services while Korea will gain access into Singapore’s construction, logistics, and professional 
services 
 
●  Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership Agreement (JMEPA) 
○  In December 2002, Malaysia proposed the JMEPA  
○  Agreement started January 2004 
○  FTA was signed December 2005  
○  Malaysia will immediately remove tariffs on all parts imported for local car production and duties on 
most finished vehicles will be scrapped by 2010 
 
●  Laos-Thailand Preferential Trade Agreement  
○  FTA under implementation since 1991 
 
●  PRC-Hong Kong Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement  
○  FTA under implementation since January 2004 
 
●  PRC-Thailand Free Trade Agreement  
○  FTA under implementation since October 2003 
                                                  





FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT SIGNED AND FTA UNDER NEGOTIATION  
●  ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP) 
○  Japan proposed in January 2002 the establishment of AJCEP 
○  Following the Framework for AJCEP (signed October 2003), consultations for the liberalization of 
trade in goods and services, and investment started in 2004 and negotiations began in April 2005 
to conclude after 2 years 
○  Implementation of AJCEP, including FTA, will be completed by 2012, taking into account the 
economic levels and sensitive sectors in each country, including allowing additional five years’ time 
for newer ASEAN members 
 
● Japan-Philippines  Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) 
○  In May 2002, the establishment of a working group was proposed to study the possibility of an EPA 
between Japan and the Philippines 
○  In December 2003, both sides decided to start negotiations for JPEPA in early 2004 
○  Agreements reached November 2004 involve comprehensive reduction or elimination of tariffs on 
industrial products and agriculture, forestry, and fishery products 
○  Tariffs on almost all industrial products will be removed within 10 years from the day the JPEPA 
becomes effective 
 
●  ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area (AKFTA) 
○  Negotiations for AKFTA began in February 2005 and are expected to be completed by end 2006 
○  AKFTA will cover trade in goods, services, investment, and other cooperation 
○  80% of products will be tariff-free by 2009 while the remaining 20% will be subject to negotiations in 
consideration of new ASEAN members’ status 
 
●  Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement (JKFTA) 
○  In July 2002, Japan and Korea formed a Joint Study Group to appraise the establishment of JKFTA 
○  Launching of the negotiations for JKFTA was done on October 2003 and conclusion was expected 
by 2005 
○  Negotiations began in December 2003 but were stalled after the 6
th round (November 2004) due in 
part to differences over the degree to which they should open the agricultural market 
○  No date yet has been set for the 7
th round of talks 
 
●  Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA) 
○  In November 2001, Thailand proposed an FTA to Japan 
○  Thailand and Japan decided to begin consultations for a broader JTEPA in April 2002 and a 
working group was formed for the purpose 
○  In June 2003, a task force was set up to expedite the process for JTEPA 
○  Negotiations started in February 2004  
○  Agreement was reached on the agricultural sector, while differences remain in areas such as steel, 
automobiles, auto parts, investment and trade in services  
 
●  Japan-Indonesia Economic Partnership Agreement 
○  Negotiation launched in June 2005 
 
 
FTA PROPOSED  
●  East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) 
○  EAFTA was proposed by East Asia Vision Group at the 5
th ASEAN+3 Summit in November 2001 
○ The  6
th ASEAN+3 Summit tasked Economic Ministers to study and formulate options on the 
gradual formation of EAFTA 
○  In November 2004, the 8
th ASEAN+3 Summit Economic Ministers decided to set up an expert 
group to conduct a feasibility study on EAFTA (existing and proposed bilateral trading 
arrangements will serve as building blocks) 
 
●  PRC-Japan-Korea Free Trade Area  
○  In November 2002, the 3 countries agreed to jointly study the economic effects of a possible FTA 
among them  
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○  A study group was formed which submitted a report in October 2003 supporting the establishment 
of an FTA and recommending the conduct of a sector-oriented study focusing on agriculture, 
electric machinery manufacturing, and automobile 
○  In May 2005, the three countries called for further studies on the FTA and for consultations to 
explore a legal framework concerning investment 
○  The three countries are now considering involving government officials in the joint study whose 
future remains uncertain until trade and investment issues are resolved  
 
●  Japan-Brunei Free Trade Agreement  
○  Leaders of Brunei Darussalam and Japan decided at the Summit Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 
December 2005 to launch scoping consultations in early 2006 with a view to start negotiations for a 
bilateral EPA. 
 
●  Japan-Viet Nam Free Trade Agreement  
○  At the Summit Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005, leaders of Japan and Viet Nam 
decided to launch the Joint Study Group from January 2005 in anticipation of negotiations for a 
bilateral EPA. 
 
●  Malaysia-Korea Free Trade Agreement  
○  Malaysia and the Republic of Korea decided to pursue negotiations on an FTA in August 2004 
○  Negotiations between the two countries will commence after taking note of developments in the 
ASEAN-Korea FTA negotiations 
 
 
●  PRC-Korea Free Trade Agreement  
○  The joint study on the feasibility and policy implications of a Korea-China FTA commenced in 
March 2005 
 
●  Taipei,China-Malaysia Free Trade Agreement  
○  FTA proposed in March 2005 
 
B.  BETWEEN EAST AND SOUTH ASIA 
FTA SIGNED AND UNDER IMPLEMENTATION  
●  India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) 
○  Under CECA (signed June 2005 and effective August 2005), India will remove duties on 506 
products from Singapore immediately, on 2,202 items by April 2009, and cut duties on another 
2,407 products to 50% by the same date 
○  Singapore will scrap tariffs on goods made in India starting 1 August 
○  The pact also covers services, investments, and cooperation in technology, education, air services, 
and human resources 
 
●  Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA, formerly Bangkok Agreement)  
○  FTA under implementation since 1976 
 
FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT SIGNED AND FTA UNDER NEGOTIATION  
●  ASEAN-India Regional Trade and Investment Area 
○  Agreement signed October 2003 and became effective July 2004 
○  Reduction or elimination of tariffs will start January 2006 
○  For India and ASEAN-6, excluding the Philippines, they have until 2011 to reduce or eliminate 
tariffs 
○  Between India and Philippines, the schedule runs to 2016 
○  For India and new ASEAN members, India will reduce or eliminate tariffs before January 2011, 
while new ASEAN members will reduce or eliminate tariffs before 2016 
○  Criteria for rules of origin remain to be resolved  
 
●  India-Thailand Free Trade Area   
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○  The Framework Agreement for India-Thailand FTA (signed October 2003 and effective September 
2004) reduces tariffs on 82 “early harvest” items by 50% in the first year, by 75% in the second 
year, and 100% thereafter 
○  The second phase hopes to have a comprehensive FTA covering all items by 2010 
○  Agreement contains a provision on emergency measures to protect domestic producers in case of 
sudden surges in imports. 
 
●  BIMSTEC Free Trade Area  
○  The Framework Agreement on BIMSTEC FTA (signed February 2004 and effective June 2004) 
involves a reduction and elimination of tariffs starting July 2006 up to 2010 for India, Sri Lanka, and 
Thailand and up to 2017 for Bhutan, Myanmar, and Nepal 
○  Negotiations began in September 2004 
○  FTA will have 2 phases (for fast track and normal track products) 
○  Members were scheduled to provide their sensitive lists to the trade negotiating committee meeting 
in June 2005 
 
 
●  PRC-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement  
○  In December 2004, a Joint Study Group was formed to study feasibility of Pakistan-PRC FTA 
○  A Memorandum of Understanding on FTA and Other Trade Issues was signed in April 2005 
announcing the conclusion of the Joint Feasibility Study on Pakistan-PRC FTA and launching of 
negotiations on the FTA 
○  The Agreement on Early Harvest Program (EHP) was also signed 
○  EHP includes a common list of items whose tariffs will be removed and a separate list by each 
country whose duties will also be scrapped. 
 
●  India-Korea Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) 
○  A Joint Study Group was set up on 6 October 2004 and its concluding report was signed on 
January 2006. It recommended that a comprehensive economic partnership agreement (CEPA) 
would exploit the existing bilateral economic relations between the two countries and provide 
significant benefits for both.  
○  Following the recommendations of the Joint Study Group, a Joint Task Force composed of 
government officials of both countries was constituted for the development of the CEPA. 
○  FTA negotiation launched in March 2006 
 
●  Malaysia-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement 
○  FTA negotiation launched February 2005 
○  Early Harvest Program (EHP) signed October 2005 for implementation January 2006 
 
●  Pakistan-Singapore Free Trade Agreement 
○  FTA negotiation launched August 2005 
 
●  Pakistan-Indonesia Free Trade Agreement 
○  On November 2005, Pakistan and Indonesia signed the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership and expressed willingness to conclude an FTA. 
○  Both parties decided to negotiate a preferential trade agreement and move towards the goal of an 
FTA.   
 
FTA PROPOSED   
●  China-India Regional Trading Arrangement  
○  In June 2003, India and the PRC agreed to set up a Joint Study Group (JSG). The JSG was tasked 
to present a report and recommendation on comprehensive trade and economic cooperation. 
○  In March 2005, report of the JSG was finalized recommending a China-India Regional Trading 
Arrangement, which shall cover trade in goods and services, and investments.  
 
●  Japan-India Economic Partnership Agreement  
o  On 29 November 2004, Japan and India agreed to establish a Japan-India Joint Study Group 




○  On 29 April 2005, both parties directed the JSG to submit a report within a year, focusing on 
requirements for a comprehensive expansion of trade in goods and services, investment flows, and 
other areas of economic cooperation. 
 
○  FTA proposed August 2005 
 
●  Malaysia-India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement  
○  FTA proposed January 2005 
 
●  Pakistan-Philippines Free Trade Agreement  
○ FTA  proposed  2004 
 
●  Pakistan-Thailand Free Trade Agreement  
○  FTA proposed April 2004 
 
●  Singapore-Sri Lanka Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement  
○  FTA proposed October 2003 
 




Appendix 2: Bilateral Correlation of Industrial Production Indexes and 
Real Interest Rates, and Trade Intensity Index
18 
 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18  Only January data are shown for each year. 
PRC = People’s Republic of China, INO = Indonesia, JPN = Japan, KOR = Korea, MAL = Malaysia, PHI = Philippines, 
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